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RESTRICTED
THE ARMED FORCES AND PUBLIC INFOR MATION
IN WAR AND PEACE
A lecture delivered by

Mr. Erwin D. Canham

at the Naval War College
May 6, 1948

It isn't really necessary to take much time to seek to prove
the importance of public information and a sound public informa
tion program. I don't know that we Americans have learned the
significance of public information as quickly or perhaps even as
completely as some of our enemies. A good deal has come to light
in the last decade about public information and its uses-a good
deal that is revealing and very important. As an illustration, the
diary of the notorius Dr. Goebbels, which has quite recently been
published, is filled with revealing tips as to the power of propa
ganda.
I shall seek throughout everything I have to say to make
clear and to emphasize the great and profound difference between
a public relations program in a democracy and one in a dictator
ship. In a democracy one responds to the right of the people to
know certain things, and the attitude is one of opportunity between
the official and the public-while in a dictatorship public informa
tion is used as an unscrupulous and ruthless tool of thought con
trol. The fact that public information can be used as an extremely
powerful weapon of thought control indicates that it is a subject
which can no longer be safely ignored. Since dictatorships have ·
always recognized and used public information as a frankly con
fessed weapon it behooves us to think it out more carefully and see
Mr. Canham is Editor of the "Christian Science Monitor," and Vice
President of the American Society of Newspaper Editors.
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wherein a sound program of public relations is an important as
set and a valuable instrument in attaining definite objectives.
I mentioned Dr. Goebbels and his diary. Dr. Goebbels has
an extreme sensitiveness to words. For example, shortly after
Hitler came to power in Germany Dr. Goebbels saw to it that the
word "assassination" never appeared in the German press. So
fin(;lly drawn was this concept of propaganda and of thought con
trol that Dr. Goebbels, as one of the great experts in the field,
decided that the mere publication of the word "assassination" was
contrary to the Nazi interest.

Perhaps the greatest illustration of the use of public in
formation as a powerful weapon is the illustration of the Soviet
Union today. It is quite obvious that the Russians are afraid of
information; they are afraid of any ideas, any set of facts which
may, to any degree, challenge their approved doctrine. The Iron
Curtain around the Soviet Union is the result and it grows higher
and higher with every passing week.

The fear-inspired efforts
to plug every possible loop-hole in that barrier get more intensive
with every passing week.
I recently spent a month in Geneva in rather arduous ne
gotiations with the Soviet Union and it was perfectly obvious to
me that some of the best talent and most profound study in the
Soviet Union is being devoted to the problem of thought control
in the effort to isolate and insulate the Soviet Union from any
sort of infiltration of ideas from the outside world. You prob-

�

ably know that right now a purge is going on in Moscow-a
purge of all individuals who have had any contact whatsoever
with the West. One by one, individuals who have had some contact with the West are being removed from positions of responsibility. They are being sent somewhere east of the Urals or
to th.e salt mines or some such place where even their slight contact
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with the West will not contaminate the remainder of the popula
tion with ideas which may be alien and somewhat challenging
to the approved doS!trine. That purge is going on. Our corres
pondent reports to us of the steady progress of this effort to
weed out everybody who has been in contact with the West.
You may remember that at one time the Red Army took
over a rest hotel in Karlsbad where general officers were per
mitted to go and enjoy the waters. It was decided some months
ago that Karlsbad was too dangerous, too far west, for even a

general officer to sojourn and so the rest hotel at Karlsbad was

closed.

This is just a further indication of the recognition which

is being given to the field of public information. It should
awaken us more fully than ever before to the importance of un
derstanding the potentialities in this field.
This is not a field which Americans take to with any de
gree of satisfaction or ease. I doubt very much if many men in

this room would greatly relish plunging into the task of handling
publicity. I could be wrong, but it is my feeling that we are in
stinctively repelled by the effort to try to control people's thinking.
My major thesis is that we do not have to get into the
position and the attitude of Dr. Goebbels or of any other totalitar
ian manipulator of public thinking; that there is a different basis,
a different formula, and a different concept and relationship which

can be worke<J out in a representative government which can be
maintained and carried through with complete dignity, propriety
and self respect; that this can be carried through in an atmosphere
in which we are never seeking to soften up the other man's thinking
or his right to think, but in which we are responsive to his need to
know the largest possible area of fact, truth, and sound doctrine.
This is of course an age of publicity, not only in the totali11
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It is a brash new world of pub
licity and we have to find out how to live in it. We might as well
conclude that the newspaper, the radio and the P. R. 0., like the
tarian states but in our own.

automobile, are here to stay.

Instead of kicking against any irk

some and irritating attributes of this weapon, we should learn
better how to use it. I assure you that this is a study that will pay

dividends as many have already discovered.

I should like to make it clear, near the outset, that news
paper men, people on our side of the fence so to speak, have a
very great deal to learn. We have to accept new obligations of res
ponsibility in these very troublesome days.

candid newspaper man will recognize it)
ponsibility on the side of the press.

There is (and every

far too much irres

I

We work for the most part

under a considerable handicap, a handicap that goes all the way

back to events which took place in the Garden of Eden.

The

human mind is more interested in conflict, in disaster, in sensa

tion, and in scandal, than in constructive, sound, forward-looking

and sometimes unexciting developments.

For the most part, publicity is built upon conflict and

sensation and for this reason newspapers are more or less in a

constant battle with their better selves.

They are aware of the

ways in which it is possible to cater to this human desire for

sensation and scandal, conflict and disaster.

At the same time

every newspaper editor knows that he has a responsibility to the

people-the responsibility to try to tell the truth.

The acceptance

of this responsibility and the setting of higher standards, I think,
has made some progress within the American press.

However

the fact remains that in conducting public relations activities one

must deal with an activity in which there is a premium on con

flict, revelation of secrets, trash, scandal, and sensation.

It is

important to help newspapers rise above these imperatives which

tend to drag them down.

It is important to help newspapers
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carry through the responsibility which they owe to the public, to
the nation, to the well-being of all.
It is also true in many respects and with few exceptions
that newspapers and radios live in abysmal ignorance of the
Armed Forces. This means that the public is almost equally in
such abysmal ignorance.
Ignorance is a constant danger; ignorance is the weapon
of totalitarianism. Iron Curtains are always a greater danger
to the power seeking to hide behind them than they are to anyone
else. I believe Iron Curtains more often hide weakness than
strength. Perhaps some of you can confirm this statement from
personal observation.
About a little over a year ago when I was in Japan, I was
taken by Capt. Decker down to Yokosuka to visit the former Jap
anese naval base there. Captain Decker and other officers made
it very clear to me that the tremendous wall of secrecy which
the Japanese built about that particular spot hid weakness rather
than strength and that the stories which we had heard during the
thirties of vast dreadnaughts and of other great developments
being worked out in the Japanese shipyards were, to a large ex
tent, myths which had been able to come into being, spawn and
flourish behind walls of ignorance. Therefore, obviously, these
Iron Curtains of ignorance are in a sense a greater danger to the
person who is seeking to erect and maintain them than they are
to the rest of us •
Of course it is necessary sometimes, in an emergency, to
hide weakness. Everybody recognizes the necessity for the right
forms of censorship in wartime and for the concealment of mili
tary secrets in peacetime. There is a tendency for censorship
to become habit forming and for information which could break
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down public ignorance to be held up long after the need for
secrecy. There have been violations, gross and grave violations,
of what should have been a patriotic obligation not to print. I
think those violations will be fewer and the right relationship will
be maintained if every responsible officer in the armed services is
prepared to weigh the legitimate need for secrecy against the

legitimate need of the public to know. More often than not,
ignorance is the greatest danger of all. Public participation, pub
lic partnership, is a great good in itself. which must . be achieved
in the largest possible degree.·
The armed services are part of the public services of the

nation which means that ·an officer in the armed services is a

public servant and like other public servants he must accept as a

part of his public obligation the duty of giving an account of
himself to the public. This is done through proper channels,
in a proper way and through such media of ultimate expression
as the press, the radio and so on. The more accurately and the

more fully the public understands the goal and the performance

of the armed services, the more whole heartedly will the public
support those services. Particularly in these precarious times,

it is desperately important for the public to understand the
precise role of the armed services. All this means that today,
more than ever before in peacetime, it is necessary for the armed
services to study the duty, the opportunity and the technique of
public relations.
More than once during the recent war, several of these

three qualities were not adequately recognized. We did see an
enormous expansion of technique during the war. Public relations
officers blossomed everywhere but their mere existence is far from
enough. Some of the worst crimes against public information,
some of the greatest damage to the armed services themselves and
to individual officers was done by public relations officers who
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misunderstood and misapplied their energies. Conversely, some
of the best public information work was done not by public re
lations officers but by professional officers who had grasped the
duty and opportunity of a public relations program.
We have come a very long way from the exasperated of
' ficer, early in the last war, who once declared at a Washington
cocktail party, speaking of war correspondents, "I wouldn't tell
them anything until the war was over and then I'd tell them
who won." This is a natural enough feeling and one can sym
pathize with it, particularly if one has known some war corres

pondents. Nevertheless strength comes from the people and the
ultimate strength of the Armed Services will rest upon the de
gree of public support. Public relations technique can be stymied

if there is not a recognition, from the top on down, of the duty of
keeping the public informed. ' I wish to quote an eloquent para
graph recognizing this duty and put into excellent words by Lt.

General Collins, now Deputy Chief of Staff. This paragraph
says what I think we all agree on; forgive me if it is covered
in terms of the Army:
"Responsibility of the Army is to make sure that
the public has real information on which to base sound
evaluation of it's Army. The Army has nothing to hide
and nothing to fear if it recognizes the public as a partner,
as well as a boss; if it ignores the captious critic and
assumes that public confidence is there for the making.
But it cannot expect that confidence unless it is deserved.
The individual soldier, commissioned and enlisted, is res
ponsible for seeing that it is deserved. It �s the responsibility of the Commander to see to it that his officers and
men conduct themselves in the manner that will win the
public esteem and that the military establishment has
the high professional standards expected of it by the pub
lic. It is the job of the public relations officer to assist
the Commander .in cementing this partnership with the
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public by providing accurate, full, and unbiased· informa
tion and by interpreting the profession of arms to a nation
which is eager to be proud of its armed srvices."
That is the basic relationship which needs to be understood and
carried out.
I had personal contact with a good deal of public relations
work in the last war and it is my impression that the very best
public relations work was done at the top. I had the opportun
ity during the war of sitting in on informal conferences with
Admiral King and General Marshall. Both of these men did a
superb job of discussing with our group (which was representa
tive of the nation's editors) the state of affairs, the problems

which arose, difficulties and so on. To my knowledge there was
no instance of any violation of their confidence.
The best public refations. work can be done at the top and

the tone can be set which will permeate the entire service. If it
, is continuously recognized that the greatest possible achievement
is to get close· to the people, then the public relations program
will be on a sound basis. I don't know whether it is worthwhile

to go into any post-mortems of some of the public relations work
of the last. war. In preparation for this talk I asked half a dozen
of the members of our staff who were themselves either public
relations officers, several of them in the Navy, or who were war
correspondents, to give me memoranda analyzing the problem as
they had seen it in action during the second World War.
gave me some very hard-hitting and candid answers.

They

They support the point that I have been making, that the
main thing is to get underneath the psychology which would
naturally prefer to fight a war in private. Secrecy is an im

portant part of war. You deal properly here, day in and day
out, with classified documents and information, confidential and
secret material.

In the nature of things you may be more ac-
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customed and more indoctrinated with concealing than with re
vealing. That point of view, which is entirely proper and sound,
has to be reconsidered in relationship to the problem of public
'information. You are trained to think accurately, precisely and
scientifically. The average newspaper writer is not necessarily
trained to think in quite that same way. He is trained to in

terest the public. Hence there is not a natural meeting of minds
between men trained as you are and men who are trained as
That gulf has to be bridged. It can be
newspaper men.
bridged if it is realized that along side this duty of secrecy,'
which should never be breached, is the positive advantage of

letting the public know everything that it can know safely. The
advantage of an informed public has to be weighed against the

precaution taken by not giving out information. It is a little bit
like the relationship of sins of commission and omission. There
is a natural inhibition against letting information out unless there
is some positive reason for it or unless the information is perfect

,ly innocuous. That attitude must be studied and re.;.examined in
the light of the importance of an informed public.
There was a revolution in public relations during the last

Our men who were both public relations officers and war
correspondents agree that in late '44 and '45 the expansion of

war.

public relations in the Pacific was on the whole a very healthy
and important decision. The gratitude of the press to the men
who were responsible for that expansion and revolution in policy
is great. It was, however, an uphill job.

I want to outline the elements of a constructive public re
lations program. First, establish a general concept, from the
Naval Academy on up, that it is important for the public to un
,derstand that information is a precious asset to be used con
structively and advantageously.

It is important to have the at.;.
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titude, not of constant desire to hold everything back, but of
responsiveness to the opportunity of public relations which pro
duces an instinctively right public relations program. We have
to get back to fundamental thinking in a responsible government
and to realize that the support of the public is, as I have said
so often, the most precious and valuable asset that can be had.
The second element is to establish clearly the distinction
between information and propaganda. I think one of the worst
curses which ran through our public relations program, particular
ly during the war, was a sort of shame-faced feeling on the
part of responsible officers that they were really being called
upon to become propagandists and they didn't like being propa
gandists. This instinctive American abhorrence for propaganda,
and an out-and-out dislike for the word is sound and right. No
one should be called upon to become a propagandist and no one en
gaged in public relations work should shoulder the inferiority
complex of thinking that he is a propagandist. There doesn't have
to be any propaganda to it. The problem is simply one of an open
channel of information between the services and the people. I
think the curse, the feeling that one is a propagandist, came into
being especially when adverse and disagreeable news had to be
handled. That need not be the case at all. Responsiveness is the
keynote. A relationship, a bond, a link, a channel, between the
services and the public is the keynote. Responsibility, not pro
motion or propaganda is the basic word.
Don't worry too much about adverse publicity on stories
which are technically incorrect or seem to be undesirable. It
wouldn't do much harm if officers who are forced in this mael
strom of public relations could get some of the psychological at
titude of the politician. The successful politician, as you all know,
has a hide as thick as an elephant and only starts worrying when
18
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he doesn't get into the headlines. An adverse headline is regard
ed as just as much of an asset as a favorable headline. The im
portant thing is that the politician has to be talked about, to be
in the news-not forgotten. You remember the advertising cam
paign which went on for a good many years warning people of
the horrors of pink tooth-brush. The campaign was finally
abandoned partly because so many people kept going into drug
stores and asking to buy a pink toothbrush.
This really proves the point that confused public concepts
do build up but in spite of this it is important to have the public
aware of the Navy and of its basic problems. The public will not
always be as wrong as the pink toothbrush people were. I have,
and I think probably you all have, a rather profound belief in the
fact that public opinion balances up; that while any number of in
dividuals may be wrong, there is a certain fundamental righ�ness
in the general will and in the general direction of the popular opin
ion when at least a minimum of information gets to the people.
So I say it is important not to be too sensitive, too meticulous, or too
fussy about the things one gets into in this public relations business,
but emulate the hard-boiled old politicians. I have never heard
Mayor Curley of Boston complain although nine-tenths of his pub
licity in the last 25 years has been seemingly adverse. The old
scoundrel knows that any publicity has a certain value. This is
a pretty cynical view I know, gentlemen, but you are up against
a profession which has to deal with popularization.
It is necessary to study the techniques ()f public relations
and to be in touch with experts in the profession as the situation
requires. There is a wide diversity of opinion as to the techniques
of public relations. It is not a scientific professon with every
thing worked out on a slide rule basis but at the same time
there are experts. Newspaper men are not, by any means, always
19
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the best experts in the field; there is a difference between the
role of the reporter and the role of the public relations officer.
One of the most successful public relations officers in the service

of the American government, Mike McDermott, of the State De
partment, has been at the business for over a quarter century.
He was never a newspaper man. As a matter of fact, Mike start
ed out as a stenographer and began to absorb, by some kind of
osmosis, the necessary relationship between the press and the gov
ernment service.

As I said, many other newspaper reporters who have tried
to do the same thing have failed because of the difference be
tween the public relations relationship and the reporter's relation
ship with the press. However, there is a technique and it is being

studied and developed to a degree. Progress fa being made in re

ducing this to terms which may be studied and comprehended by
people coming in from the outside.

But this technique is tremendously subordimrte to attitudes.
One basic attitude is the value of maintaining contacts, of getting
close to newspaper men and keeping close to them. I emphasize

that it is valuable to maintain this contact at the highest level pos
sible and to add plenty of follow-through at lower levels. If you

·do have contact with the newspaper men, friendships and relation

ships, social and informal contacts, then I think you will begin to
understand more clearly the viewpoint of the newspaper man. You

will understand that his job is the task of popularizing things, of
getting into people's thinking, and you may soften up some of your
quite natural indignation at the over-simplification of problems. It
is a very difficult thing to convert a technical subject to terms the
public can readily understand. There are bound to be errors, lack
of precise and explicit qualifying remarks, in every popularized
account but it is a problem we cannot get around and have to

20
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accept. A lot of this publicity will be repulsive to the expert but,
nevertheless, it does serve a useful purpose in getting through to
public thinking.
I strongly recommend the habit of press conferences when
ever there is any need and opportunity. It is even possible to come
to enjoy press conferences after a certain amount of experience
with them.
I have already referred to the importance of understanding
the viewpoint of newspapers. Newspapers cannot escape the ob
ligation of popularizing material, the duty of holding public in
terest. This need for popularizing is terribly overdone and abused
but we are dealing with the people who will decide the pattern of
national defense in the United States. We must inform and edu
cate them. We cannot ignore them; we cannot permit them to
remain in the shadow of ignorance which has frequently surround
ed them. This goes pretty deep. The difference between our
selves and our enemies in this world is probably best. defined as
the differnce between a nation which respects the individual as the
most important element and value within the nation and one which
declares the individual to be valueless and the state to be all im
portant and all powerful.
The only way totalitarian states can maintain their hold on
the people, can make their force actually operative, is to control,
to destroy the independent thinking of their people. By allo�
ing public expression there is bound to be conflict and diversity
of thinking. This was the primary issue at. our conference on
Freedom of Information at Geneva. The great cleavage between
the Ea.stern Bloc and ourselves was this: they believe in one single
set of ideas, imposed by force, which is infiltrated into the people's
thinking by artful devices, subtle techniques and ruthless re
pressions----in short, by complete thought control; while to us
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· strength comes from diversity and a belief that all progress comes
from the conflict of ideas.
This basic principle of diversity, of conflict, of growth
through the stress or strain of ideas meeting in healthy conflict,
we believe will produce strength. I think that by taking a long
historic viewpoint the germs of weakness contained within the
totalitarian system are those which have wiped out genuine self

criticism; whereas with us, self-criticism and conflict of ideas pro
duce a healthy organism which goes forward, revises its ideas, im
proves its ideas, and carries them ahead.
The relationship of that principle with the press is this:

You will encounter a diversity in publications and a diversity of

treatments in the press.

It will be apparent that the viewpoint

and technique of one newspaper w.ill be very different from an

other, but if you appreciate that the vagaries, the irresponsibilities,

the over-simplifications of the press go back to the· idea of free
and diverse opinions, you will be more tolerant and will se.e that any
effort to generalize or to standardize the· press will be a technique
pointed in the totalitarian direction and would lead us away from

-our greatest source of strength which is our cantankerousness and
our unwillingness to accept standardized concepts. I am deeply
confident that techniques of study and of working out problems

here, as in every other well conducted American institution, will be
based on constant reexamination of ideas. That is part and parcel
of our public information system.

Freedom of the American press depends upon diversity.

Your relationship to the press will depend upon the recognition
of its importance to the public and of its value to you. There
is no chance of a meeting of minds between the East and the West
on so fundamental a matter of principle as this matter of public
information, but we in the West must not be victims to totalitar-

22
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ian thinking to such an extent that we will deny the people the

diversity of information which will enable them to go forward,

which will enable them constantly to reexamine, to criticize and

to grow strong through self-examination and self-criticism.

In two. wars, the two greatest and most tragic wars of his

tory, the United States Navy was headed by newspaper publishers
Secretary Daniels 'and Secretary Knox.

After the First World

War the Navy became involved in the most extensive disarmament

program in our national experience. After the Second World War

the Navy ran into an economy wave which had for a time very

grave consequences.

These two experiences would seem to indi

cate that there is still a very large unsolved problem about the pub

lic's information concerning its armed services despite enormous

efforts and real progress.

It is fair to conclude that that prob

lem has not yet been adequately solved.

I repeat, take seriously

the opportunity of getting closer to the public through the media of

public information. I believe that every officer should be conscious
of the significance of this task, not as an onerous chore, not as an

undignified and unworthy type of dissemination of propaganda,

put rather as an enormous opportunity to be responsive to the need
and the right of people to know everything which will not be a
positive danger.

Now as I said before, I think you have to work primarily

against a viewpoint which rightly and almost instinctively holds
that it is safer not to talk too much.

One has to be aware and

conscious at all times that along side of this important obligation

must go the requirement to do a better job of breaking down the
barriers of ignorance by giving the American people more informa

tion with which to grow through conflict and diversity, criticism
and reexamination; to grow into an appreciation of the world res
ponsibilities which have become ours.

This relationship of pub-
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lie information to the future of peace or war in the world is sim
ple to understand. It is simple but the people of the United
States must understand the importance of a strong national de
fense of arms adequate to maintain our duty and obligation in this
storm-tossed world. Unless the American people do adequately
understand these necessities the dangers of war are doubled and

If the American people do understand the necessity of
strength at this time, if instead of some vague and ignorant concept
based largely on fear they understand that our rearmament pro
trebled.

gram of today is not a war program but a peace program, then, in
deed, there is a possibility of maintaining peace in the world.
At Geneva in our small way we ran the gamut of relation
ships with the Eastern Bloc. American diplomacy since the war
has not been very shrewd or successful in its relationship with the
Eastern Bloc but certain fundamentals had managed to seep

through. As we pr�pared our tactics for the Geneva conference
we decided that the basic thing was to take a very strong, almost a

provocative, position at the outset, to maintain it throughout and
to get the jump on every single point where we could get our pro
posals, our ideas and our policies in first. The chief American

delegate at the opening session of that conference made an ex
tremely strong and provocative speech which completely changed
the tone of the conference. The Russians immediately turned con
ciliatory, placating and appeasing. They sought to weedle around
the middle group nations to support an appeasing attitude. Every
time we came in strong the air cleared, and the Eastern delegates
had to appeal for some form of conciliation, some form of com
promise. We maintained to the end a refusal to compromise, say
ing it was impossible to compromise in a field of basic principles.
Now that teaches us a lesson that the American people
ought to understand. The American people are being appealed to
today by various individuals who know that the American people

24
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want peace. •It is perfectly obvious that the American people want
peace but not at any price. We want to insure peace but our ex
perience at Geneva proved to us again that the way to insure peace
is through strength, vigor and capacity; to lay down a position
and to maintain it.

The American people have not altogther understood that. To
people a rearmament program sometimes seems a
American
the
war-like program.

I believe that the undeviating informational

line of the armed services should be : that our rearmament program

is a peace program, not a war prog�am; that it is the only basis

on which we can hope, at this stage of human and world experi

ence, to insure peace; that the sacrifice and expenditures which

the American people are being called upon to make are not expendi

tures in the interests of war but rather expenditures in the interests

of preserving the peace and that the program of appeasement which
Mr, Henry Wallace, for example, is presenting to the American

people and to which he is getting a response, is due to the basic

craving of the American people to avoid a Third World War, a

craving which is perfectly sound and right but based upon ig
norance.

The whole problem of peace comes down to this problem
· of dispelling fears by letting the American public see that the

necessity for supp<;>rting a rearmament program is not because

we are afraid of the Russians or of anyone else, but because it is
the way to achieve peace at this time. Public int�rest on this sub

ject will not be dispelled through silence but will be dispelled
through a responsive attitude toward the need of the public to
know everything that it possibly can. If any chances are taken
they must be taken on the side of knowledge rather than on the
side of ignorance.
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I believe that this opportunity can be seized and that we do
have a chance to achieve a stable world. It is a necessity to carry
through this kind of information program if the armed forces are
to preserve their rightful place as pillars in the temple of peace.
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